The treaty of Lisbon and European Union trade policy: A political-economic analysis by Crombez, Christophe & Van Gestel, Wim
The treaty of Lisbon and European Union trade policy: 
A political-economic analysis
Christophe Crombez and Wim Van Gestel
DEPARTMENT OF MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS, STRATEGY AND INNOVATION (MSI)
Faculty of Business and Economics
OR 1113
 1 
The Treaty of Lisbon 
and European Union Trade Policy: 
A Political-Economic Analysis 
 
Christophe Crombez 
Wim Van Gestel 
 
September 2011 
 
Abstract 
This paper presents a game-theoretical analysis of European Union (EU) trade 
policy and the Lisbon Treaty’s impact on it. Specifically, it develops spatial 
models of the EU’s international trade negotiations process, and analyzes the 
European Parliament’s increased involvement in it as a result of the introduction 
of the Parliamentary consent requirement for international trade agreements. We 
find that the Council’s right to set a negotiating mandate in trade negotiations is 
equivalent to an amendment right, and that the Commission’s right to propose a 
negotiating mandate to the Council is comparable to a monopoly proposal right 
in the negotiation process with the trade partner. We further conclude that the 
Parliament’s enhanced role limits the Commission’s ability to set policy and 
conclude negotiations. Even though it represents a domestic constraint for the 
Commission, the Parliament’s involvement does not reinforce the Commission’s 
bargaining position in international negotiations. The Commission can use the 
negotiating mandate to improve its bargaining position instead. 
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1 Introduction 
 
The European unification process, launched in the 1950s with political 
objectives in mind, has progressed farther on economic issues than in any other 
policy area. The internal market and the monetary union, even though they may 
be in crisis today, precisely because of a lagging political unification, stand out as 
its most momentous achievements. Other economic policies that are now the 
exclusive competence of the European Union (EU) include competition policy 
and external trade.   
 This paper focuses on the EU’s external trade policy, referred to in the EU 
treaties as the common commercial policy. Since the Treaty of Rome entered into 
force in 1958, the EU member states have delegated the conduct of trade policy to 
the EU and specifically to the Commission, a political body appointed by the 
EU’s other two main political institutions, the Council and the European 
Parliament (EP). 1  2  As a result the Commission conducts international trade 
negotiations for the member states. The EU, as represented by the Commission, 
is also a member of the World Trade Organization together with its member 
states. 
 The Treaty of Lisbon, which was ratified in November 2009, altered EU 
trade policy in three important ways.3 First, external trade became the exclusive 
competence of the EU. In particular its authority was extended to include all 
issues concerning trade in services, trade-related aspects of intellectual property, 
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and foreign direct investment.4 As a result trade agreements no longer need to be 
ratified by national parliaments.  
Second, the use of qualified majority voting in the Council was extended.5 
Unanimity still applies, however, to trade in cultural and audiovisual services 
and social, education and health services, if cultural or linguistic diversity or the 
national organization of these services is threatened.6  
Third, the EP is now more involved in trade policy. The Commission 
needs to report to it during trade negotiations and its consent is required for the 
adoption of trade agreements.7 Moreover, the codecision procedure now applies 
to trade legislation.8  9  Prior to the Lisbon Treaty the consultation procedure 
applied. Under consultation the EP was merely consulted, but its opinion could 
be ignored. Under codecision the EP’s approval is required for the adoption of 
legislation, and it can amend Commission proposals together with the Council. 
The Lisbon Treaty’s changes to EU trade policy addressed the three 
objectives set out in the 2001 Laeken Declaration that launched the process of 
treaty reform: the enhancement of its effectiveness in world politics, its decision-
making efficiency, and its democratic character. Bringing trade policy into the 
exclusive competence of the EU arguably increases its effectiveness, since 
member states weigh more on international negotiations if they act as one. The 
use of qualified majority rule rather than unanimity improves its efficiency. The 
EP’s increased involvement, finally, improves its democratic character. 
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The EU’s legislative procedures and the EP’s increased involvement in the 
legislative process have received considerable attention in the political economic 
literature thus far.10 Crombez (1997, 2001) finds that the EP’s involvement under 
codecision reduces the sets of policies that can be adopted and diminishes the 
powers of the Commission. Applying his analysis to EU trade policy suggests 
that efforts to liberalize trade may suffer as a result of the Lisbon Treaty, if the EP 
is more protectionist than the Commission or the pivotal member states. If the EP 
is less protectionist than the Commission and the pivotal member state, the 
prospects for trade liberalization are unaffected.  
 In this paper we focus on international trade negotiations, rather than the 
legislative process, and study how they are affected by the increased 
involvement of the EP. We formulate a game-theoretical model of the EU’s trade 
negotiations process. The model yields predictions regarding the outcomes of 
trade negotiations and how trade agreements are affected by the EP’s 
involvement. It offers important insights into the role of the negotiating mandate 
and its impact on trade agreements. The mandate outlines what policies the 
Commission can agree to during trade negotiations. The Council sets it at the 
Commission’s proposal prior to the start of the negotiations. 
 We find that the Commission includes in its mandate the policies that 
satisfy the following two conditions. First, they are preferred to the status quo by 
a qualified majority of the member states, the EP, and the trade partner. Policies 
that satisfy this condition can be adopted. Second, no policy that can be adopted 
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is preferred to them by all member states. If the mandate includes policies that 
do not satisfy this second condition, it is amended. If the Commission has all the 
bargaining powers in its negotiations with the trade partner, it successfully 
proposes the policy it likes most from among the policies in its mandate. If it 
does not have all the bargaining powers, it can achieve the same results by 
restricting its mandate. The EP’s increased involvement since the Lisbon Treaty’s 
ratification does not strengthen the Commission’s bargaining powers in the 
negotiation process. It merely adds a constraint and thus reduces the prospects 
for trade liberalization.  
 The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present our 
model of EU trade negotiations. The third section studies what trade agreements 
emerge from the negotiation process. In the fourth section we analyze the role of 
the negotiating mandate, and in the fifth section we examine the impact of the 
Lisbon Treaty. Section six presents the conclusions. 
 
2 A Model of EU Trade Negotiations 
 
2.1 Actors and Preferences 
 
The political actors in our model of EU trade negotiations are the m 
member states, the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), the 
Commissioners, and the EU’s trade partner. We assume that these actors care 
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about policy and have Euclidean preferences. That is, they have ideal policies 
and prefer policies that are closer to rather than farther away from their ideal 
policies. Thus, they can be represented by points in the policy space. We assume 
for simplicity that the policy space P   is one-dimensional.11 The dimension 
could represent the degree of trade liberalization, for example.  
The European Parliament (EP) and the Commission use simple majority 
voting, and there are no restrictions on amendments. As a consequence, the 
analysis of trade negotiations can be simplified by focusing on the ideal policies 
of the median Commissioner and the median MEP. Suppose the status quo is to 
the right (left) of the median Commissioner’s ideal policy, then the median 
Commissioner and all Commissioners on his left (right) then want a move to the 
left (right). As a result, any policy is defeated in the Commission by policies that 
are closer to the median Commissioner's ideal policy (e.g. Black, 1958). A similar 
reasoning applies to the EP. The Commission and the EP can thus be treated as 
unitary actors with ideal policies equal to their medians’ ideal policies. 
The Council is not represented as a unitary actor because it uses Qualified 
Majority Voting (QMV) to adopt negotiating mandates and trade agreements 
and unanimity rule to amend mandates. Nonetheless, the analysis of trade 
negotiations can be simplified by focusing on the member states that are pivotal 
under the QMV and unanimity rules. Under the QMV rule, 255 votes out of a 
total of 345 are currently needed to defeat the status quo.12 The member state a  
that is pivotal for a rightward move thus has an ideal policy to the left of the 
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member state with the median vote. In particular, it is the member state with the 
91st vote (from the left). Member state a and the member states to its right then 
have at least 255 votes, and the member states to its right do not constitute a 
qualified majority without it. Similarly, the member state b that is pivotal for a 
move to the left is the member state with the 255th vote. It is to the right of 
member state and the member state with the median vote. Thus, if it wants to 
move to the left, member state does too. Under unanimity rule the two most 
extreme member states 1 and m are pivotal. 
In sum, there are seven potentially relevant actors in trade policy making: 
(1) the Commission, as represented by the median Commissioner; (2) the EP, as 
represented by the median MEP; (3,4,5,6) the member states 1, a, b and m; and (7) 
the EU’s trade partner. We refer to member states a and b as the pivotal member 
states, and to member states 1 and m as the extreme member states. 
 
2.2 The Negotiation Process 
 
The sequence of events in the negotiation process is shown in Figure 1. 
First, the Commission offers to start trade negotiations with a trade partner.13 In 
particular it proposes a negotiating mandate to the Council. A negotiating 
mandate is a set NM  P of trade agreements the Commission is allowed to 
negotiate with the trade partner. It provides an opportunity for the Council to 
limit what the Commission can do during the trade negotiations.  
a
a
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--- Figure 1 about here --- 
 
Next, the Council can amend the mandate by unanimity. We assume for 
simplicity that only one member state k can propose an amendment. The 
(amended) mandate subsequently needs to obtain qualified majority support in 
the Council for approval. If it is rejected, no negotiations take place and the status 
quo prevails. If the mandate is approved, by contrast, negotiations with the trade 
partner begin.  
The Commission conducts the negotiations for the EU. There is no formal 
procedure for the negotiations between the Commission and the trade partner. 
We assume for simplicity that during the negotiations the Commission proposes 
a trade agreement to the trade partner.  
The trade partner can then accept or reject the proposed agreement. If she 
rejects, no agreement is concluded and the status quo prevails. If the trade 
partner accepts the proposed agreement, it is subsequently presented to the 
Council for approval. Approval requires qualified majority support. If the 
agreement falls short of a qualified majority in the Council, the status quo 
prevails.  
Since the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty the EP also needs to approve the 
trade agreement for adoption. If it rejects, the status quo prevails. If both the EP 
and a qualified majority in the Council accept, the trade agreement is adopted. 
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The model incorporates complete and perfect information. We use the 
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium concept.  
 
3 Trade Agreements 
 
In this section we characterize the equilibrium trade agreement as a 
function of the actors’ preferences and the location of the status quo. When 
initiating trade negotiations and proposing a negotiating mandate in the first 
step of the negotiation process the Commission looks ahead and considers what 
trade agreements can get adopted. Similarly, the other political actors look ahead 
in the subsequent stages of the process. For that reason we use backward 
induction to study what trade agreements are adopted. 
In the last two stages of the negotiation process, as shown in Figure 1, the 
Council and the EP vote on the trade agreement. If either rejects the agreement, 
the status quo prevails. The member states and the EP thus compare the 
agreement to the status quo. They vote in favor of the agreement if they prefer it 
to the status quo. For an agreement to be adopted in the last two stages of the 
negotiation process it thus has to be preferred to the status quo by the EP and a 
qualified majority in the Council. An agreement can thus be adopted only if the 
EP and the pivotal member states want to move in the same direction away from 
the status quo. 
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Let AEP be the EP’s acceptance set, that is, the set of policies the EP prefers 
to the status quo. It is the set of policies that are closer to its ideal policy than is 
the status quo. That is, the set AEP=[min{2pEP-q,q},max{2pEP-q,q}], where q is the 
status quo and pEP is the EP’s ideal policy. The policy 2pEP-q is the policy that 
makes the EP indifferent to the status quo. It is equidistant from the EP’s ideal 
policy as is the status quo. Similarly, let AQM be the qualified majority’s 
acceptance set, the set of policies a qualified majority prefers to the status quo. 
That is, AQM=[min{2pb-q,q},max{2pa-q,q}], where pa and pb are the ideal policies of 
the two pivotal member states. The EU’s acceptance set AEU, the set of 
agreements that can be adopted in the last two stages of the negotiation process, 
is then the set AEPAQM.14 
Figure 2 illustrates what agreement emerges from the negotiations for a 
particular configuration of ideal policies. In the Figure the trade partner T is on 
the far right of the policy space. She wants more trade liberalization than the 
other actors, for example. The EP is to the left of the pivotal member states, MSa 
and MSb, and is thus more protectionist than they are, but not as much as the 
most protectionist member state MS1. The Commission C is on the right, more so 
than the least protectionist member state MSn, but not as far to the right as the 
trade partner. The status quo is at the very left of the policy space. 
 
--- Figure 2 about here --- 
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The Figure shows the EP and qualified majority acceptance sets for the 
particular configuration of ideal policies. As the EP is more protectionist than are 
the pivotal member states, the EP is the crucial actor in the last two stages of the 
process. If the Commission can obtain its approval for the agreement, the 
agreement is adopted. The EU’s acceptance set is thus equal to the EP’s 
acceptance set. If member state a were more protectionist than the EP, member 
state a’s acceptance set would be the EU’s acceptance set.  
In the sixth stage of the process the EU’s trade partner considers the 
Commission’s proposed trade agreement. If she accepts the proposed agreement 
and the EP and the Council subsequently approve it as well, the proposed 
agreement is adopted. Otherwise the status quo prevails. The partner thus 
accepts the agreement if she prefers it to the status quo. In particular she votes in 
favor if the agreement is closer to her ideal policy than is the status quo, that is if 
it is in her acceptance set AT=[min{2pT-q,q},max{2pT-q,q}]. The set ANP of proposed 
agreements that can be adopted in the last three stages of the negotiation process 
is then the set ANP=ATAEU. A move away from the status quo can thus only be 
adopted if the pivotal member states, the EP and the trade partner all want to 
move in the same direction away from the status quo. In what follows we assume 
that they all want to move to the right.  
In Figure 2 the trade partner wants to move farther away from the status 
quo than does the EP: it wants more trade liberalization. It thus accepts all trade 
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agreements that the EP accepts. The acceptance set in the negotiation process is 
thus equal to the EP’s acceptance set. 
In the fifth stage of the process the Commission proposes a trade 
agreement. It can propose any agreement within the negotiating mandate NM 
that was approved in the previous stage. For the agreement to be adopted it 
needs to be preferred to the status quo by the trade partner, the EP and a 
qualified majority in the Council: it needs to be in the acceptance set ANP. 
Otherwise the status quo prevails. The Commission thus successfully proposes 
the agreement p* it prefers most from among the policies that are in the set 
NMANP.  
In equilibrium this set is non-empty. In fact, the Commission has no 
incentive to propose a mandate that includes policies that are not in the 
acceptance set ANP. Such policies cannot be adopted. Including them in the 
mandate is thus equivalent to including the status quo. The status quo is in the 
acceptance set ANP. The Commission can just propose the status quo, if it wants 
to maintain it. Similarly, member state k has no incentive to propose an 
amendment that includes policies that are not in the acceptance set ANP. In 
equilibrium the mandate is thus in the acceptance set: NM ANP. For that reason 
we only consider mandates and amendments that are in that set in what follows. 
In the fourth stage of the process the member states vote on the (amended) 
negotiating mandate NM. They look ahead and consider the policy that will be 
adopted if the mandate is granted. They vote in favor of the mandate if they 
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prefer that policy to the status quo. That policy is preferred to the status quo by a 
qualified majority, as seen above, because any policy that is eventually adopted 
is preferred to the status quo by a qualified majority. A qualified majority thus 
votes in favor of the mandate. 
In the third stage the member states vote on member state k’s amendment 
NMk to the mandate NMC proposed by the Commission. The amendment needs 
unanimous support for approval. Again, the member states look ahead. They 
consider the policy p*(NMk) that will be adopted if the amendment is approved, 
and compare it to the policy p*(NMC) that is adopted if the mandate proposed by 
the Commission is not amended. The member states then vote in favor of the 
amendment if they prefer policy p*(NMk) to policy p*(NMC).  
For the amendment NMk to be approved the policy p*(NMC) thus needs to 
be to the left (right) of all member states’ ideal policies. Only then are there 
policies all member states prefer to it. It needs to be outside the support S=[p1,pn] 
of the member states’ ideal policies. This implies that the mandate NMC contains 
such policies, that is NMCS.  
Suppose the mandate NMCS and there are policies that can be adopted 
and are also in the support S, i.e. ANPS. All member states then prefer at least 
some of the policies in this intersection to the policy p*(NMC). Thus, the mandate 
NMC can be amended. In fact, member state k successfully proposes an 
amendment that is in this intersection in the second stage. 
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Suppose the mandate NMCS and there are no policies that can be 
adopted and are in the support S, i.e. ANPS=. All member states then want to 
move farther away from the status quo than the trade partner or the EP are 
willing to accept. The best trade agreement the member states then can get is the 
agreement that makes the trade partner or the EP, whichever is closer to the 
status quo, indifferent to the status quo. If the Commission does not propose this 
policy as a mandate, the mandate NMC can be amended.15 In fact, member state k 
then successfully proposes this policy as an amendment in the second stage. 
Thus, for the mandate NMC not to be amended it needs to be in the 
support of the member states ideal policies, or, if no policy in the support can be 
adopted, it needs to be the policy that is closest to the support from among the 
policies that can be adopted. The negotiating mandate NM that emerges from the 
third stage of the process is thus either a subset of the support S, or it is the 
policy that is closest to S from among the policies in the acceptance set ANP. That 
is, the mandate NM is a subset of the mandate set M, with M=ANPS if 
ANPS, and M={min{2pT-q,2pEP-q}} if ANPS=. 
In Figure 2 the support S does intersect with the acceptance set ANP. 
However, there are policies in the acceptance set that are to the left of all member 
states’ ideal policies, to the left of MS1. These policies are not in the mandate set 
M=ANPS. If the mandate NMC includes such policies, it can be amended.  
In the second stage member state k can propose an amendment to the 
mandate NMC. If the mandate NMC is a subset of the mandate set, no amendment 
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can be approved. Member state k then chooses not to propose an amendment. 
Otherwise it proposes an amendment that is in the mandate set, as mentioned 
above.  
In the first stage the Commission proposes a mandate. The agreement that 
is adopted at the end of the process needs to be within the mandate. The 
mandate thus constrains the Commission’s choices when it proposes an 
agreement later on in the process. For this reason the Commission has no 
incentive to propose a mandate that is narrower than the mandate set. It will thus 
successfully propose as a mandate the mandate set: NM=NMC=M. This is 
illustrated in Figure 2. In the Figure the Commission subsequently successfully 
proposes as trade agreement the policy p*=2pEP-q that makes the EP indifferent to 
the status quo. Proposition 1 summarizes the results. 
 
Proposition 1 In trade negotiations the Commission successfully proposes as a 
negotiating mandate the set of policies that are preferred to the status quo by the pivotal 
member states, the EP and the trade partner, and are within the support of the member 
states’ ideal policies. If no policy satisfies these conditions, it proposes the policy that is 
closest to the support of the member states’ ideal policies and preferred to the status quo 
by the pivotal member states, the EP and the trade partner. The trade agreement that 
emerges from the process is the policy the Commission prefers most from among the 
policies in the negotiating mandate.  
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4 The Role of the Negotiating Mandate 
 
The negotiating mandate is an important feature of the EU’s trade 
negotiation process. In an imperfect information world, in which the political 
actors do not know each other’s preferences or the consequences of policies 
perfectly well, the process of setting the mandate provides an opportunity for the 
Commission and the member states to exchange information on preferences and 
the consequences of policies. It enables member states to give the Commission an 
idea of what policies they will accept at the end of the negotiation process, while 
allowing the Commission to choose different policies in response to what it 
learns about preferences and the consequences of policies in the negotiations 
with the trade partner. 
Ours is a perfect information model, however, and thus the mandate does 
not convey any extra information in it. Nonetheless the mandate plays an 
important role in our model. It allows the member states to set limits on what the 
Commission can do in the negotiations with the trade partner. In particular we 
show that the mandate prevents the Commission from making an agreement 
with a trade partner, if there is another policy that would be adopted at the end 
of the process and is preferred to the agreement by all the member states.  
The Council’s right to set the negotiating mandate prior to the start of the 
negotiations with the trade partner is thus equivalent to a right to amend trade 
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agreements prior to their adoption. For practical reasons trade agreements 
cannot be amended at the end of the process, because that would require the 
reopening of negotiations with the trade partner. Our paper shows that the 
Council has no need for such an amendment right, because it can achieve the 
same results by setting the negotiating mandate. Proposition 2 summarizes this 
result. 
 
Proposition 2 The Council’s right to set the negotiating mandate is equivalent to 
an amendment right. 
 
Whereas the member states can use the negotiating mandate to limit the 
agreements the Commission can make, the Commission can use its right to 
propose the mandate to obtain a more advantageous agreement in the 
negotiations with the trade partner. In our model the Commission was assumed 
to have a monopoly proposal right and thus all the bargaining powers in the 
negotiations with the trade partner. So, it could obtain the agreement it liked 
most from among the policies in the mandate. The Commission then did not 
have an incentive to further limit the mandate.  
If the trade partner does have bargaining powers, however, and the 
Commission does not obtain its most preferred agreement from the mandate as a 
result, then the Commission does have an incentive to restrict the mandate to 
make sure that it obtains the policy it prefers most from the mandate. It can 
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achieve this by excluding from the mandate the policies that the trade partner 
prefers to its most preferred agreement. By restricting the mandate the 
Commission then obtains the same policy it would obtain if it had all the 
bargaining powers.  
Suppose that in Figure 2 the trade partner had the same preferences as 
MS1, for example, and that she proposed the agreement in stage five. In that case 
the Commission would exclude the policies left of 2MS1 from the mandate. The 
agreement that would emerge from the negotiating process would then be the 
policy 2MS1 that makes member state 1 indifferent to the status quo.  
Proposition 3 summarizes this result. 
 
Proposition 3 The Commission’s right to propose a negotiating mandate is 
equivalent to a monopoly proposal right in the negotiation process with the trade partner. 
 
5 The Impact of the Lisbon Treaty 
 
As a result of the Lisbon Treaty the EP’s consent is required for the 
adoption of a trade agreement. Prior to the ratification of the Treaty in November 
2009 this was not needed. The Treaty thus added one more condition for an 
agreement to be adopted in the last stages of the negotiation process: it reduced 
the acceptance set from ATAQM to ATAQMAEP. The Treaty inserted an extra 
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veto player in the trade negotiation process and limited the set of agreements 
that can be adopted, thus reducing the Commission’s powers and the prospects 
for trade liberalization.  
Our theory shows that the presence of an extra ‘domestic’ EU veto player 
in trade negotiations since the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty does not 
strengthen the bargaining position of the Commission in its negotiations with the 
trade partner, contrary to what the literature on the role of domestic constraints 
in international bargaining suggests (e.g. Putnam, 1988). This literature argues 
that the presence of a domestic veto player with more extreme preferences than 
the negotiator, may work to the advantage of the negotiator.  
This argument would suggest that the Lisbon Treaty increased the 
Commission’s bargaining powers. However, it presumes that the Commission 
did not already have all the bargaining powers. As we discussed in the previous 
section, the Commission can use its right to propose a mandate to strengthen its 
bargaining position in the negotiations and obtain its most preferred agreement 
from among the agreements that can be adopted. The Commission’s right to 
propose the negotiating mandate thus effectively gives it all the bargaining 
powers. As a result the extra domestic constraint imposed by the Lisbon Treaty 
does not strengthen the Commission’s bargaining powers in the negotiation 
process.  
Proposition 4 summarizes this result. 
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Proposition 4 The EP’s involvement in the trade negotiation process does not 
strengthen the Commission’s bargaining position in the negotiations with the trade 
partner, because the Commission can use its right to propose the negotiating mandate to 
this effect. The EP’s involvement merely adds a veto player to the process, and thus 
reduces the set of agreements that can be adopted and the Commission’s powers. 
 
 
6 Conclusions 
 
In this paper we formulated a game-theoretical model to analyze the EU’s 
procedures for conducting international trade negotiations and study how the 
outcomes of the negotiations are affected by the increased involvement of the EP. 
Our model also offered important insights into the role of the negotiating 
mandate and its impact on trade agreements. 
 We found that the Commission includes in its mandate the policies that 
satisfy the following two conditions. First, they are preferred to the status quo by 
the trade partner, the EP, and a qualified majority of the member states. Policies 
that satisfy this condition can be adopted at the end of the process. Second, no 
policy that can be adopted is preferred to them by all member states. If the 
mandate includes policies that do not satisfy this second condition, it is amended 
prior to the start of the negotiations with the trade partner.  
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We further found that if the Commission has all the bargaining powers in 
its negotiations with the trade partner, it successfully proposes the policy it likes 
most from among the policies in its mandate. If it does not have all the 
bargaining powers, it can achieve the same results by restricting its mandate.  
We also concluded that the member states’ right to amend the negotiating 
mandate prior to the start of the negotiations is equivalent to an amendment 
right after the negotiations.  
Finally, our theory showed that the EP’s increased involvement since the 
Lisbon Treaty’s ratification does not strengthen the Commission’s bargaining 
powers in the negotiation process. It merely adds a constraint and thus reduces 
the prospects for trade liberalization. At this point it is too early to test our theory 
empirically: only one trade agreement (with South Korea) has been concluded 
since the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. 
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1 There are three main institutions involved in EU policy making. The EP and the Council can be 
considered as the two chambers of a bicameral legislature. The EP is directly elected for five-year 
terms and represents the people. The member states are represented in the Council. The EP and 
the Council co-legislate on most important policy issues. The Commission is the EU’s executive 
body. It also has monopoly proposal rights in the legislative process. 
2 See, for example, Damro (2007), Dür (2008), Kerremans (2003), Meunier (2005) and Van Gestel 
(2010) for analyses of the reasons for and consequences of the delegation of trade policy to the 
Commission. See Franchino (2005) for a formal analysis of delegation in the EU. 
3 See Woolcock (2008) for an analysis of the Lisbon Treaty’s impact on EU trade policy. 
4 See Articles 3 and 206 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). 
5 See below for a definition and analysis of the qualified majority rule. 
6 See Article 16.3 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and TFEU 207.2 and 207.4. 
7 During the negotiations the Commission reports to the EP’s committee on international trade 
and consults the Council’s trade policy committee. We present a perfect information model. In 
such a model these committees play no significant role. Therefore, we do not further discuss their 
roles. For an analysis of the trade policy committee’s role in international negotiations, see Van 
Gestel and Crombez (2011). 
8 The codecision procedure was introduced by the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. Subsequent treaties 
have extended its use. The Lisbon Treaty renamed it the ordinary legislative procedure. 
9 See TFEU 207.2 and 218.6. 
10 See, for example, Crombez (1996, 1997, 2001), Moser (1997), Steunenberg (1994), Tsebelis (1994) 
and Tsebelis and Garrett (2000) for game-theoretical analyses of the legislative process. See 
Thomson (2011) and Thomson et al. (2006) for tests of such theories. 
11 Our conclusions also hold in multi-dimensional models. We present a one-dimensional model 
merely because its verbal analysis and figures are less complicated. For the purposes of our 
analysis no additional insights would be gained from multi-dimensional models. 
12 More precisely a qualified majority currently consists of: (1) 255 out of 345 votes; (2) from a 
majority of member states; (3) representing at least 62 percent of EU population. For simplicity, 
we ignore conditions (2) and (3), but this has no effect on the conclusions. The member states 
receive votes based on population, with the largest states getting 29 votes and the smallest having 
three. Under the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty the qualified majority rule will change in 2014.  
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13 The Commission does not have gatekeeping rights. See Crombez et al. (2006) for an analysis of 
gatekeeping. 
14 In the limited number of instances in which unanimity in the Council is required the set 
AEU=AEPAUN, where AUN is the unanimous Council’s acceptance set, the set of policies all 
member states prefer to the status quo.  
15 Mandates and amendments are defined as sets. So, strictly speaking the mandate can be 
amended if it is not equal to the singleton that consists of the policy that makes the trade partner 
or the EP, whichever is closer to the status quo, indifferent to the status quo. 
